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Corporate Insolvency Reforms in England: Rescuing a “Broken Bench”? 




«Let no debt remain outstanding, except the continuing debt to love one another, for whoever 
loves others has fulfilled the law» [Romans 13:8] 
 
Abstract 
Common wisdom suggests that corporate insolvency frameworks should be 
efficient, flexible and adaptable. Measuring such benchmarks is a challenging task 
better left to economists. This doctrinal paper assumes that the English corporate 
insolvency system can reach these goals if it offers a balanced and reasonably broad 
array of options to the debtors in distress. These options should include liquidation 
of assets, rescue of the business (or part of it) and rescue of the company (and as 
much of its business as possible). 
The recently enacted Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 addresses some of 
the alleged inefficiencies of the English framework. One of the key innovations is the 
introduction of a new restructuring plan. This paper assesses the need for such 
procedure in light of the established practice of light touch administrations.  
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The economic impact of the Covid-19 outbreak has triggered calls for emergency 
fiscal and legislative measures1 to address liquidity and legal problems. All over the 
world, countries adopted measures to support companies2 in financial3 and 
economic4 distress, sometimes introducing new or amending existing insolvency 
rules.5  
 
* Lecturer in Company and Corporate Insolvency Law (University of Essex), PhD (City, University of 
London), LL.M. (London School of Economics and Political Science). The author is greatly indebted to 
Dr. Yseult Marique for her insightful comments on earlier drafts of this paper, and to Ruaidhri Cantillon 
for his constructive criticism of the manuscript and for his diligent proof-reading of this work. This 
article covers literature and case law published before 1 July 2020. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1 Institute of Directors, ‘Business leaders’ confidence plummets amid coronavirus concerns’  (10 
March 2020) <https://www.iod.com/news-campaigns/press-office/details/Business-leaders-
confidence-plummets-amid-coronavirus-concern> accessed 1 July 2020 (arguing that the Government 
must be at the ready to take swift action to help cash-strapped businesses bridge); Institute of 
Chartered Accountants for England and Wales, ‘COVID-19 and financial services’ (11 March 2020) 
<https://www.icaew.com/technical/financial-services/covid-19-and-financial-services> accessed 1 July 
2020; R3, ‘R3 responds to Chancellor’s COVID-19 measures’ (18 March 2020) 
<https://www.r3.org.uk/press-policy-and-research/news/more/29296/page/1//> accessed 1 July 2020; K 
Makortoff and others, ‘Thousands of firms may fail if rescue schemes not expanded, says CBI’ The 
Guardian (London, 23 April 2020) <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/apr/23/thousands-of-
firms-may-fail-if-rescue-schemes-not-expanded-says-
cbi?utm_term=RWRpdG9yaWFsX0J1c2luZXNzVG9kYXktMjAwNDI0&utm_source=esp&utm_mediu
m=Email&CMP=bustoday_email&utm_campaign=BusinessToday> accessed 1 July 2020. 
2 This article adopts the terms “company” and “corporation” as synonyms. It does not use the term 
“firm” because under the English tradition the latter connotes primarily a partnership. 
3 “Financial distress” is a condition in which a company (or individual) cannot generate revenue or 
income because it is unable to meet or cannot pay its financial obligations. This is generally due to 
high fixed costs, illiquid assets, or revenues sensitive to economic downturns. A financially distressed 
corporation can be viable if its business - i.e. the organized efforts and activities of individuals to 
produce and sell goods and services for profit - is sound and there is a market for its products. 
4 “Economic distress” is a condition in which a company (or individual) cannot generate revenue or 
income because the underlying business or activity is not viable and sound, as there is no market for 
the products manufactured or sold by the company (or individual). 
5 For a global guide on the measures adopted to support distressed corporations and businesses 
through the Covid-19 crisis, see the document prepared by the World Bank in association with INSOL 
International: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialsector/brief/finance-and-covid-19-
coronavirus> accessed 1 July 2020. 
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In England, the Government first enacted measures to make it more difficult for 
creditors to wind-up companies.6 The judiciary and other bodies adopted initiatives 
to adapt to the new environment and working conditions emerging as a result of the 
Covid-19 pandemic.7 More recently, the Government announced8 new regulatory 
changes, soon after translated into the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 
(‘CIG Act’).9  
The CIG Act introduces temporary (such as the suspension of wrongful trading 
provisions) insolvency measures to deal with the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. It 
also introduces permanent (such as a new restructuring plan) changes to the English 
framework to promote the rescue of distressed yet viable companies. This paper 
focuses on one of the long-term changes to the English framework, i.e. the 
introduction of such restructuring procedures.  
The Government first proposed this new restructuring procedure on the basis that 
the English system did not feature debtor-in-possession (‘DIP’) formal insolvency 
procedures capable of binding all creditors, including dissenting junior classes, 
through the use of a cross-class cram down provision.10 Some commentators, 
 
6 For instance, the Temporary Insolvency Practice Direction effective from 6 April 2020, which 
adjourned all non-urgent insolvency applications and petitions listed for hearing prior to 21 April 
2020. Available here: <https://www.trinitychambers.co.uk/media/2654/temporary-ipd-april-
2020_.pdf> para. 4, accessed 1 July 2020. According to the same document, HMRC has suspended the 
majority of insolvency activity for now, unless it is deemed to be essential (i.e. there is suspected 
fraud or criminal activity). 
7 For instance, the Coronavirus Act 2020 provided generally for the increased use of remote hearings, 
as well as media access and the availability of recordings online. It was followed by a protocol 
prepared by the Judiciary of England and Wales, which implemented these measures. Further to this, 
the Master of the Rolls and Lord Chancellor have introduced new Emergency Practice Directions.  
8 The press release is available here: <https://www.gov.uk/Government/news/regulations-
temporarily-suspended-to-fast-track-supplies-of-ppe-to-nhs-staff-and-protect-companies-hit-by-
covid-19> accessed 1 July 2020. 
9 The CIG Act was fast-tracked through both Houses (the Bill was introduced on 20 May 2020), 
received royal assent on 25 June 2020 and entered into force the day after. 
10 Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, Insolvency and Corporate Governance. 
Government Response (26 August 2018) 63 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/Government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
736163/ICG_-_Government_response_doc_-
_24_Aug_clean_version__with_Minister_s_photo_and_signature__AC.pdf> accessed 1 July 2020. 
4 
 
however, argued that the proposals were too similar to existing provisions in 
company law and insolvency law. As a result, the new restructuring procedure was 
not needed as it would add further complexity to the framework.11 
These commentators were probably referring to the innovative practices developed 
by the insolvency industry to deal with companies in distress. One of these practices 
is the “light touch” administration (‘LTA’). In LTAs, administrators rely on a 
provision of the Insolvency Act 1986 (‘the Act’)12 to give consent to the directors to 
continue to exercise certain board powers during the procedure. As a result, 
administration is transformed from a practitioner-in-possession (‘PIP’) to a DIP 
procedure. This means that the debtor rather than an independent insolvency 
practitioner (‘IP’) retains the control of the company during the insolvency 
procedure.  
LTAs happened in the past in high profile cases, such as Railtrack, Metronet and 
Turner and Newall. More recently, the retail company Debenhams announced its 
intention to use a LTA to turn around its business.13 There is evidence that several of 
UK retailers and restaurant chains such as Oasis & Warehouse14 intend to follow 




12 Paragraph 64, Schedule B1 IA 1986. 
13 J Booth, ‘Debenhams administration could provide blueprint for ‘freezing’ companies during 
coronavirus crisis’ City A.M. (London, 6 April 2020) <https://www.cityam.com/debenhams-
administration-could-provide-blueprint-for-freezing-companies-during-coronavirus-crisis/> accessed 
1 July 2020.  
14 E Jahshan, ‘202 immediate job cuts as Oasis & Warehouse files for administration’ Retail Gazette 
(London, 15 April 2020) <https://www.retailgazette.co.uk/blog/2020/04/202-immediate-job-cuts-as-
oasis-warehouse-files-for-administration/> accessed 1 July 2020. 
15 J Eley and T Kinder, ‘Companies explore ‘light touch’ administration in the wake of Debenhams’ 
Financial Times (London, 16 April 2020) <https://www.ft.com/content/76c7c985-ff8c-4707-b4e4-
28eb7a8f7b62> accessed 1 July 2020. 
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Despite this apparent success, LTAs may have adverse effect: they may fill the 
market with “zombie” entities,16 and make the insolvency framework less 
transparent and fair for the purpose of promoting efficiency,17 flexibility and 
adaptability. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate to what extent (if any) the recent 
introduction of the restructuring procedure to the English insolvency corporate 
framework enhances the flexible and adaptable nature of the existing system 
without affecting its transparency and fairness. 
The new restructuring plan is assessed against LTAs, a (so far) little researched tool. 
To the best knowledge of the author, this is the first paper to critically assess these 
procedures in light of the criteria mentioned above, and to encourage a discussion 
on the use of these procedures to promote company rescue. This critical analysis is 
particularly important due to the increasing popularity of LTAs (and the expected 
popularity of the new restructuring plan) as well as the relative lack of guidance 
from either the legislator or the courts. 
 
16 A “zombie” company is any corporation that uses its cash flow to repay the interests of existing 
debt, with little or no prospective of repaying the principal loan or creating added value for its 
stakeholders. For further discussion, see: M Stothard and C Giles, ‘Zombies seen to hold back 
recovery’ Financial Times (London, 13 November 2012) <https://www.ft.com/content/5fc26aaa-2dad-
11e2-9988-00144feabdc0> accessed 1 July 2020; C Elliott, ‘The Zombie Budget Deficit’ (2013) 6 C.R. & I. 
78; N Hood, ‘The Inexorable Rise of Britain’s Army of the Walking Corporate Debt’ (2013) 6 C.R. & I. 
180. See also: RN Banerjee and B Hofmann, ‘The rise of zombie firms: causes and consequences’ (Bank 
for International Settlements, 23 September 2018) <https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1809g.htm> 
accessed 1 July 2020; R Armstrong, ‘How to avoid a corporate zombie apocalypse’ Financial Times 
(London, 5 February 2020) <https://www.ft.com/content/1d87c9ec-4762-11ea-aeb3-955839e06441> 
accessed 1 July 2020 (investigating the risk of zombie companies in the retail industry in particular); 
M Greene, ‘Bailing out the oil industry brings a fate worse than death’ Financial Times (London, 19 
April 2020) <https://www.ft.com/content/4a6494e2-7fbe-11ea-b0fb-13524ae1056b> accessed 1 July 
2020. 
17 It is possible to categorise “efficiency” as a substantive (ends-efficiency) or procedural (means-
efficiency) goal: RJ Mokal, Corporate Insolvency Law: Theory and Application (OUP 2005) 24-26. A 
substantive goal of the law is the particular end that the law seeks to achieve and which justifies the 
existence and the mechanics of the statute. On the other hand, procedural goals are the benchmarks 
used to assess if a particular mechanism achieves its substantive goal in the desired manner (i.e. 
efficiently). This article adopts the procedural interpretation of the notion of “efficiency”. 
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This paper strongly suggests that the recently introduced measures in light of 
existing statutes, cases and academic commentaries make the system more efficient, 
flexible and adaptable, but at the expense of transparency, fairness and 
accountability.  
Building on a wide literature, this paper discusses the criteria to assess the flexibility, 
adaptability and efficiency of the system in light of the purposes of corporate 
insolvency law. Moving away from theoretical approaches, this paper focuses on a 
critical and pragmatic analysis of the law and case law. The point is not to achieve 
compliance with theoretical ideas but to ensure that a wide range of options exist to 
companies that file for a formal insolvency procedure.18 These options include not 
only the liquidation of the debtor’s assets, but also the rescue of the company or its 
business.  
The first original contribution of this article is to demonstrate that the English 
corporate insolvency framework has developed into one of the most flexible and 
adaptable systems in the world thanks to its holistic, menu-approach to corporate 
distress. Petitioners under English insolvency law can rely on a wide range of 
efficient options, from liquidation of the company’s assets to rescue of the company 
and/or its business. Debtors can, therefore, rely on procedures designed to address 
their temporary or long-term difficulties in an efficient manner. 
Second, this paper shows that some of the recent regulatory reforms and the judicial 
interpretation of existing provisions are mis-focused, as they promote efficiency, 
 
18 “Formal procedures” are collective insolvency procedures, which involve all the creditors, under 
the control or supervision of a court and an independent practitioner. Debtors may retain the control 
of their assets (debtor-in-possession or ‘DIP’ procedures), but their freedom is significantly restricted. 
An automatic stay of individual enforcement actions is usually granted upon application. The 
liquidation or rescue plan is binding on all creditors, including dissenting ones.  With reference to 
England, formal procedures include administration, creditors’ voluntary liquidation and company 
voluntary arrangements. Administrative receivership is not a collective procedure, while schemes of 
arrangement (and the new restructuring plan) are not regulated by insolvency law. 
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adaptability and flexibility at the expense of fairness, transparency and 
accountability.  
This article proceeds as follows. Part II demonstrates that what makes the English 
corporate insolvency framework efficient, flexible and adaptable is the balanced 
array of rescue and liquidation options for companies in crisis. Part III carries out a 
doctrinal analysis of LTAs to determine to what extent the existing provisions in the 
insolvency law as interpreted by the courts and applied by the practitioners result in 
an efficient, flexible and adaptable insolvency framework. Part IV extends the 
analysis to the new restructuring procedure introduced by the CIG Act, in order to 
determine if the new procedure is less prone to cause issues of transparency, 
accountability and fairness than LTAs. Part V of this paper summarises the findings 
of this research. 
 
II. The Rationale Underpinning the English Corporate Insolvency Framework 
The risk of business failure is an essential element of entrepreneurial activity and can 
only be eliminated by not doing business at all.19 Insolvency is a fact of life.20 
Insolvency law becomes a topic whenever debtors are ultimately unable to meet 
their financial commitments.  
The law provides principles for an orderly resolution of competing and sometimes 
irreconcilable interests. These principles are informed by the theories discussed in 
the next section of this paper. As demonstrated below, no one purpose should 
prevail over the others. As a result, it is argued that the flexibility, adaptability and 
efficiency of the English framework are dependent on offering a range of options 
that address the different situations of distress that debtors may encounter. 
 
19 R Goode, Commercial Law in the Next Millennium (Hamlyn Lectures 1998) (Sweet & Maxwell 1998) 
45-46. 




II(a). Theoretical Framework 
The English corporate insolvency framework is a combination of some of the most 
established theories on the purpose of this area of law. These theories have been 
translated into statutes, as outlined below. 
Under English law, the main statutory sources include the Act, the Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986 (‘CDDA 1986’) and their associated secondary legislation. 
These are complemented by other domestic legislation introducing special regimes 
for some entities,21 carve-outs for classes of transactions, such as financial ones or 
special treatments for some creditors.22 Finally, there is the need to consider common 
law rules applying alongside the law,23 equitable principles24 and EU laws.25  
First, there are rules that promote the collective and equal treatment of creditors (par 
condicio creditorum) while prohibiting any deviation from the absolute priority rule26 
and the rights negotiated by the parties in solvent times.27 Examples of these rules 
 
21 See, for instance, the special regime for NHS trusts in the National Health Service Act 2006. 
22 See, for instance: Employment Rights Act 1996 and Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) 
Regulations 2006. 
23 See, among others, the anti-deprivation principle, i.e. a principle of public policy that “no person 
possessed of property can reserve that property to himself until he shall become bankrupt, and then 
provide that, in the event of his becoming bankrupt, it shall pass to another and not his creditors” 
(Whitmore v Mason (1861) 2 J & H 204, 212 per Sir William Page Wood V-C).See also: Money Markets ltd 
v London Stock Exchange [2002] 1 W.L.R. 1150; and Belmont Park Investments Pty ltd v BNY Corporate 
Trustee Services ltd [2011] UKSC 38; [2012] 1 A.C. 383. For an analysis, see, among others: K van 
Zwieten, Goode on Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2019) ch. 7. 
24 Such as that the company ceases to be the beneficial owner of its property upon winding-up: Ayerst 
v C&K (Construction ltd) [1976] AC 167 (HL).  
25 Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on 
Insolvency Proceedings (recast) [2015] OJ L 141/19. 
26 The absolute priority rule states that shareholders should receive nothing until creditors have been 
paid in full: D Baird and TH Jackson, ‘Bargaining after the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute 
Priority Rule’ (1988) 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 97; TH Jackson and R Scott, ‘On the Nature of Bankruptcy: an 
Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors’ Bargain’ (1989 75 Va L. Rev. 155. 




are the automatic stay28 on individual actions against the debtor29 and the 
enforceability in insolvency proceedings of (among others): (i) security rights;30 (ii) 
other contractual or statutory rights such as set-offs and netting;31 and (iii) the right 
of forfeiture by peaceable re-entry.32  
These rules have been advocated by scholars inspired by the law and economics 
movement (creditors’ wealth maximisation theorists).33 These commentators argue 
that insolvency law should be designed to deal in a rational and efficient manner 
with the common pool problem, i.e. a situation in which the debtor’s assets are not 
enough to repay all creditors.34 If these creditors were put behind a “transparent”35 
 
28 This article employs the term “automatic stay” instead of “moratorium”. This is despite the Act 
makes reference to the notion of moratorium (paragraph 42, Schedule B1 IA 1986). However, these 
terms are not synonym. A moratorium implies a postponement of creditors’ remedies, but what is 
provided by the law is simply a suspension of these remedies. See Anderson (n 23) 73 and Barclays 
Mercantile Business Finance ltd v Sibec Developments lts [1992] 1 WLR 1253 (Ch), [1257D]. 
29 Paragraphs 42-44, Schedule B1 IA 1986. 
30 Section 4(3) IA 1986 (with reference to CVAs). The property subject to the secured claim belongs to 
the secured creditor up to the value of the claim. Such property does not form part of the insolvent 
estate. A court may enable the administrator of a company to dispose of a property subject to a 
security only where the court thinks that disposal of the property would be likely to promote the 
purpose of administration in respect of the company. Even in that case, the secured creditor has first 
priority over the net proceeds: see paragraph 71, Schedule B1 IA 1986. 
31 Rule 14.24 of the Insolvency (England and Wales) Rules 2016. 
32 Section 146 Law of Property Act 1925. However, this right may be covered by the automatic stay in 
administration procedures: paragraph 43(4), Schedule B1 IA 1986. 
33 Among others, see: TH Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (2nd edn, Harvard University 
Press: Cambridge, MA, 2001); TH Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements and the 
Creditors’ Bargain’ (1982) 91 Yale L.J. 857; DG Baird, ‘The Uneasy Case for Corporate 
Reorganizations’ (Jan. 1986) 15(1) J. Legal Stud. 127; Jackson and Scott (n 26). 
34 A common pool dilemma usually arises whenever a company is unable to pay its debts as they fall 
due or when it appears from the company’s books that it is hopelessly insolvent.  Such a “dilemma” 
or “situation” exists when there are not (or there will not be in the near future) enough assets to meet 
the creditors’ claims. These participants know that they would be better off if they managed to grab 
the assets when there are still some left. However, individual (ir)rational actions would result in 
lower overall returns to creditors on the whole and would cause disparities of treatment among 
similarly ranking claimants. This two-fold dilemma may develop into a problem whenever parties fail 
to co-ordinate their actions in order to maximise their collective benefit. On this topic, see: Jackson, 
The Logic and Limits (n 33) 10; JL Westbrook, ‘A Global Solution to Multinational Default’ (2000) 98(7) 
Mich. L. Rev. 2276. 
35 This veil of ignorance can be described as “transparent” because the participating creditors are 
aware of their legal status (whether they are employees, secured or unsecured creditors, etc), wealth, 
cognitive abilities, and bargaining strength. 
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“veil of ignorance”,36 they would acknowledge that the most appropriate course of 
action is not a race to the assets, as it would not maximise the return for all creditors 
but only for the most skilled and sophisticated.  
A proper, value-maximising system of insolvency rules should impose a stay on 
individual actions, sell the debtor’s assets at the highest bidder and distribute the 
proceeds to the creditors in a procedurally efficient manner. It should only provide a 
mechanism of collective execution against the property of the debtor.37 It should 
mandate co-ordination in cross-border insolvency cases.38 
A proper, value-maximising system of insolvency rules should not deal with the 
protection of non-creditor interests of other victims of the corporate decline, such as 
employees, managers and members of the community.39 More importantly, it should 
not establish the existence of new rights40 and it should not pursue the goal of 
keeping firms in operation.41 
Second, there are broad-based contractarian scholars,42 who argue that to deal with 
the common pool problem, creditors should be put behind a “strict” veil of 
ignorance. Behind this veil, parties are assumed to be free, equal and reasonable. 
They are given equal weight in the selection process, since their legal status (whether 
 
36 J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press 1971). 
37 This view was embraced by Hoffmann LJ in Cambridge Gas Transportation Corporation v Official 
Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2006] UKPC 26, [2007] 1 AC 508 [13]-[14]. 
Although the Supreme Court later held in Rubin v Eurofinance SA ([2012] UKSC 46, [2013] 1 AC 236) 
that the case was wrongly decided, the nature of insolvency proceedings was recognised by Collins 
SCJ at [91], [106]. 
38 For the importance of co-ordination in cross-border cases, see (among others): E Vaccari, ‘O.W. 
Bunker: A Common Law Perspective on Multi-lateral Co-operation in Insolvency-related Cases’ 
(2017) 28(7) I.C.C.L.R. 245. 
39 Jackson, The Logic and Limits (n 33) 25. 
40 DG Baird and T Jackson, ‘Corporate Reorganisations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership 
Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy’ (1984) 51 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 97. 
41 V Finch and D Milman, Corporate Insolvency Law. Perspectives and Principles (3rd edn, CUP 2017) 29. 
42 Among others, see: DR Korobkin, ‘Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy 
Law’ (1992) 71 Tex. L. Rev. 541; R Mokal, ‘The Authentic Consent Model: Contractarianism, Creditors’ 
Bargain, and Corporate Liquidation’ (2001) 21(3) Leg. Stud. 400. 
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they are employees, secured or unsecured creditors, etc), wealth, cognitive abilities, 
and bargaining strength are all morally irrelevant in framing rules of justice 
("dramatic ignorance").43 They are also deprived of any knowledge of personal 
attributes and they are assumed to act rationally. This agreement is reached ex ante, 
before any lending has taken place. 
This broad-based contractarian approach is more inclusive than the creditors’ wealth 
maximisation theory. One of its main commentators44 argues that insolvency 
proceedings should include and give voice to all the parties affected by the potential 
insolvency (principle of inclusion). The system as a whole should also feature 
rational solutions that do not unreasonably restrict the rights of creditors in the 
worst-off positions (principle of rational planning).45 
The automatic stay on the individualistic collection efforts of unsecured creditors, 
which defines the collective liquidation regime, is argued as passing the tests set by 
this model.46 However, this model also justifies variations to contractually negotiated 
rights that would be hard to defend under the model suggested by creditors’ wealth 
maximisation theorists. Such variations include the prohibition to enforce securities 
over the company’s property without a leave from the court or the administrator.47 
Other provisions compliant with the broad-based contractarian model (but not 
necessarily with value-maximising approaches) are the discipline of creditors’ 
committees48 and the powers conferred to them.49  
 
43 Mokal (n 42) 429. 
44 Korobkin (n 42). 
45 Ibid 575-89. 
46 Mokal (n 42). However, in administrations, English courts have adopted a strongly purposive 
approach to the interpretation of the automatic stay, arguing that it should be used not only to install 
the administrator but also to carry on the business of the company: Bristol Airport plc v Powdrill [1990] 
1 Ch 744 (CA), [758F]. Such purposive approach may fail to meet the requirements of broad-based 
contractarian scholars (and it sits at odds with the assumptions of creditors wealth maximisation 
theorists).  
47 Paragraph 43(2), Schedule B1 IA 1986. 
48 Paragraph 57, Schedule B1 IA 1986. 
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The broad-based contractarian theorists also argue that deviation from the principle 
of pari passu distribution could be approved ex ante by the creditors behind the 
“strict” veil of ignorance.50 As a result, a preferential treatment of some creditors 
such as employees may be justified under the law.51 Another examples is the 
possibility for the administrator to dispose of property, subject to a floating charge 
(as created), as if the property were unencumbered, without the consent of the 
floating charge holder.52 The latter may seem an example of re-distributive 
approaches to corporate insolvency, as discussed in the next paragraph. However, as 
the floating charge holder has first call on the proceeds of sale, there is no real re-
distribution of assets but simply a rational use of what is left in the insolvent estate. 
Third, communitarian theorists53 see insolvency as a process for weighing the 
interests of a broad range of constituents and for facilitating the externalisation of 
costs. Where the contractarian approaches focus on distributing value according to 
pre-established or contractually negotiated rules, communitarian scholars argue for 
re-distributing value. 
Under English law, there are relatively few rules that promote a redistribution of 
value.54 The English system is in general pro-creditor,55 but there are exceptions to 
 
49 Paragraphs 57(2) and (3), Schedule B1 IA 1986. These include to determine the administrator’s 
remuneration, as well as to require him or her to attend on the committee and provide its members 
with information about the exercise of their functions. 
50 R Mokal, ‘Priority as Pathology: The Pari Passu Myth’ (2001) 60 CLJ 581. 
51 Under category 5, paragraph 515, Schedule 6 IA 1986, employees are preferential creditors for 
wages due from work done in the four months before the insolvency date (up to £800 per person). 
Contributions to pension schemes and holiday pay are also given preferential status. These 
preferential claims are paid before unsecured creditors and holders of floating charges. However, 
these employees are also granted a more generous treatment in the same circumstances under Part III, 
Employment Act 1986. 
52 Paragraph 70, Schedule B1 IA 1986. 
53 Among others, see: E Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’ (1987) 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775; K Gross, ‘Taking 
Community Interests into Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay’ (1994) 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 1031; V Finch, 
‘The Measures of Insolvency’ (1997) 17 OJLS 227. 
54 For an exhaustive debate on the topic, see: J Armour, ‘Should We Redistribute in Insolvency?’ in J 
Getzler and J Payne (eds), Company Charges, Spectrum and Beyond (OUP 2006), 189-226. 
55 The distinction between pro-debtor and pro-creditor jurisdictions comes from PR Wood, Principles 
of International Solvency (Sweet and Maxwell: London, 1995). While the partition he proposed may no 
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this narrative.56 These include the rules on the prescribed part, i.e. a portion of the 
proceeds obtained from the sale of assets subject to a floating charge that are 
distributed to unsecured creditors.57 Other examples include exceptions to the 
enforceability of ipso facto clauses, for instance with reference to essential supply 
contracts.58  
Where security rights are overridden,59 this does not always lead to a re-distribution 
of the assets for the benefit of unsecured creditors. Hence, these provisions are not 
valid examples of redistributive, communitarian practices. On the contrary, they 
prove the general disfavour of the law to deviate from established contractual rights 
negotiated by the parties in solvent times. The only major exception is represented 
by certain preferential claims, which may surpass certain forms of security interests 
such as floating charges. 
 
longer be actual, the offered criteria are still valid. In particular, the author classifies as ‘pro-creditor’ 
any insolvency jurisdiction whose main focus is to “help the creditor escape the debacle, e.g. by 
recognizing a wide security or a set-off”, while ‘pro-debtor’ insolvency jurisdictions seek to 
“aggrandize the debtor’s estate, e.g. by restricting security, refusing insolvency set-off, […]” (36). For 
a challenge to the standard characterization as U.S. law being ‘pro-debtor’ and U.K. law being ‘pro-
creditor’, see: G McCormack, ‘Apples and Oranges? Corporate Rescue and Functional Convergence in 
the US and UK’ (2009) 18 Int. Insolv. Rev. 109. 
It is acknowledged that these labels tend to over-simplify an otherwise very complex classification 
problem. As a general rule, pro-creditor systems tend not to infringe significantly on the rights 
bargained by creditors in solvent times. On the opposite end of the spectrum, pro-debtor systems 
erode those rights whenever it appears to be appropriate to achieve the rehabilitation of the distressed 
business. Among others: M Pomerleano and W Shaw, Corporate Restructuring. Lessons from Experience 
(The World Bank: Washington D.C. 2005) 308. More recently, it was observed that traditional pro-
debtor countries such as the U.S. tend to have a legislation that protect the interests of managers and 
shareholders to a wider extent and in a more comprehensive manner that pro-creditor jurisdictions 
such as the U.K. At the same time, it was observed that secured creditors enjoy a similar level of 
protection in both pro-creditor and pro-debtor countries, even if the form of the protection is 
different. 
56 Van Zwieten (n 23) 76. 
57 Section 176A IA 1986. A prescribed part is the part of the proceeds from realising the assets covered 
by a floating charge, that is set aside and kept available, so it can satisfy any unsecured debts. The 
Cork Committee proposed a 10% fund to be carved out of floating charge assets for the benefit of 
unsecured creditors. (Report of the Insolvency Law Review Committee Insolvency Law & Practice 
(‘Cork Report’), Cmnd 8558 (1982) paragraph 1538). Under the most recent rules, the prescribed part 
consists of 50% of the first £10,000 of net floating charge realisations plus 20% of anything after, 
subject to a maximum of £800,000. 
58 Sections 233 and 233A IA 1986. 
59 Paragraphs 70-72, Schedule B1 IA 1986. 
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Asking whether any of these approaches prevail under the law is pointless. English 
corporate insolvency law is a blend of these approaches. More in general, it has been 
correctly observed that “legal systems make special provisions for dealing with the 
phenomenon of insolvency in accordance with the prevailing social ethos towards 
economic and financial failure”,60 even if “the philosophy underpinning English 
corporate insolvency law is much harder to state [than the U.S. philosophy] since it 
has rarely been clearly articulated”.61 
 
II(b). The Blended Approach Confirmed by the Enterprise Act 2002 
In this country, the Governmental policy is towards the promotion of enterprise, but 
this is not a one-dimensional perspective,62 as repeated in the most recent 
consultations on the corporate insolvency framework.63 The goals promoted by each 
of these theoretical approaches discussed above (procedural efficiency, rational 
planning and inclusion, and social justice) are blended together to create a flexible 
and adaptable system aimed at promoting entrepreneurship and maximising the 
return to creditors.  
This is particularly evident in the Enterprise Act 2002 (‘EA 2002’). This Act aimed at 
redressing the existing imbalance in favour of liquidation and business-rescue 
practices by promoting rescue practices aimed at rescuing companies rather than 
businesses.64 It also aimed at establishing an environment which promoted and 
 
60 Fletcher (n 20) 5. 
61 Van Zwieten (n 23) 75. 
62 Anderson (n 23) 9. 
63 Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, Insolvency and Corporate Governance (20 
March 2018) 5 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/6
91857/Condoc_-_Insolvency_and_Corporate_Governance_FINAL_.pdf > accessed 1 July 2020. 
64 Finch and Milman (n 41) 323. This was done by: 
1. Prohibiting directors from calling a meeting of members to consider liquidation and creditors 
from presenting a winding-up petition; 
2. Replacing administrative receivership with the more inclusive arrangements of a revised 
administration process and by ending the Crown’s status as preferential creditor.  
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managed insolvency risks proactively65 by transferring control over the debtor from 
the secured creditor and its administrative receiver to unsecured creditors and 
independent administrators.66 Finally, it also aimed at addressing some of the 
barriers to the use of administration, such as: (i) the time and cost involved in the 
procedure; (ii) the “unduly exacting standards set by the courts”67 to exercise some 
of the powers outlined in the law; and (iii) the veto powers of floating charge 
holders.68 Unsurprisingly, the Explanatory Notes to the EA 2002 clarify that the 
changes to the existing corporate insolvency regime aim at restricting the use of 
administrative receivership and streamlining administration.69  
The same Notes disclose that one of the purposes of the reform was to place greater 
emphasis on company rescue.70 As a result, paragraph 3, Schedule B1 of the Act 
replaces the existing four statutory purposes under old schedule 8(3) of the Act.71 
Under a single overarching purpose, which applies to all cases of administration, the 
administrator is required, where he or she thinks it is reasonably practicable, to carry 
out his or her functions with the objective of rescuing the company as a going 
 
In the 2018 Budget, the Government announced the intention to re-introduce this preference, at least 
with reference to VAT, PAYE income tax, student loan repayments, employee National Insurance 
Contributions (NICs) and construction industry scheme deductions. This change should have been 
effective from 6 April 2020, but it has now been postponed to all insolvencies commencing on or after 
1 December 2020: HM Treasury, Budget 2020 (12 March 2020) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/budget-2020-documents/budget-2020> accessed 1 July 
2020. 
65 This goal was frustrated by the fact that administration orders could only be applied if the court 
was satisfied that the company was or was likely to become unable to pay its debts (section 123 IA 
1986). The EA 2002 facilitated the use of administration as a rescue device, for instance by introducing 
an out-of-court appointment procedure on the application of the holder of a qualifying floating 
charge (paragraphs 14-21, Schedule B1 IA 1986) or the company and its directors (paragraphs 22-34, 
Schedule B1 IA 1986). Also, the EA 2002 removed the insolvency requirement in case of applications 
by a qualifying floating charge holder (paragraph 35, Schedule B1 IA 1986).  
66 Van Zwieten (n 23) 16. 
67 Fletcher (n 20) 486. 
68 For an outline of these barriers, see: Insolvency Service, Company Voluntary Arrangements and 
Administration Orders: A Consultative Document (October 1993). 
69 Explanatory Notes to the EA 2002, paragraphs 640 and 645. 
70 Ibid paragraph 647. 
71 For a contrast between the old and new obligations to identify the purposes of administration, see: 
Hammonds (a firm) v Pro-Fit USA ltd [2007] EWHC 1998 (Ch), [2008] 2 B.C.L.C. 159, [20]; Re Berkshire 
Homes (Northern) ltd [2018] EWHC 938 (Ch), [2018] Bus. L.R. 1744, [22]-[23]. 
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concern. In a significant departure from Cork’s recommendations,72 Parliament 
conceived administration as a mechanism to rescue companies, rather than 
businesses.  
Where that objective is not reasonably practicable or would not provide the best 
result for the company’s creditors as a whole, the administrator may pursue the 
second objective of rescuing the business. The third objective (basically, a liquidation 
of the assets) can only be pursued if:73 
1. The administrator thinks that it is not reasonably practicable to achieve either 
obj. a) or b); and 
2. This does not unnecessarily harm the interests of the creditors of the company 
as a whole. 
These purposes are, therefore, listed in order of priority. 
In order to ensure the promotion of company and – to a lesser extent – business 
rescue, the new paragraph 49, Schedule B1 of the Act provides that, as soon as 
reasonably practicable, or, in any event, within 8 weeks of the administration 
commencing, the administrator is required to make a statement setting out proposals 
for achieving the purpose of administration.74 In the same proposal, the 
administrator has to explain why company rescue is not deemed reasonably 
practicable, or would not yield the best outcome for creditors if this is not the choice 
of action recommended.75  
Finally, creditors are given powers to accept, reject or even modify the proposal, 
thus holding the administrator accountable and ensuring – at least in theory – that 
 
72 Cork Report (n 57) paragraph 193; See also: van Zwieten (n 23) 478. 
73 Paragraph 3(4), Schedule B1 IA 1986. 
74 Explanatory Notes to the EA 2002, paragraph 678. 
75 Ibid paragraph 682. 
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the purpose of rescuing the company is considered and discarded only when not 
reasonably achievable.76  
All these innovations suggest a renewed, powerful and focused interest at 
rebalancing the rescue efforts towards the company rather than its business (or parts 
of it). In practice, however, the cumbersome, procedural and lengthy nature of the 
administration procedure pushed parties to disattend the original goals 
underpinning the EA 2002 and develop the alternative approaches to rescue and 
liquidation described in the next part of the paper. 
 
II(c). Concluding Assessment 
It appears that the corporate insolvency framework as amended by the EA 2002 
promotes the efficient use of resources, as well as flexibility and adaptability. These 
goals are achieved by giving administrators – who are officers of the court – the 
power to choose among a broad range of alternative options: rescuing the company 
or its business, or liquidating its assets when rescue is not reasonably practicable and 
this would lead to a higher return to creditors.  
At the same time, the system is not perfectly balanced, as the two main formal 
insolvency rescue procedures (administration and company voluntary 
arrangements) both aim first at rescuing the company and – only when this is not 
reasonably practicable – its business. In other words, the legislator did not fully 
promote the use of a balanced range of liquidation, business-rescue and company-
rescue options. 
This led to some issues. For instance, key creditors – especially secured ones – enjoy 
disproportionate power in insolvency procedures. The protection of secured 
creditors is demonstrated (among others) by their powers to appoint an 
 
76 Ibid paragraph 682. 
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administrator out of court.77 More in general, creditors retained the power to enforce 
ipso facto clauses triggered by the commencement of an insolvency procedure 
(despite some exceptions).78 This power has been removed by the CIG Act, which 
introduced a general ban on the enforceability of ipso facto clauses.79 
Finally, at least with reference to administration, there are obstacles in the law for the 
use of this procedure to rescue companies. These include the debtor’s dispossession 
of its assets and the appointment of an outsider to run the company; the inability to 
“force” a reorganisation plan on secured creditors;80 the lack of provisions for 
financing companies in financial difficulties; and the short time frame to carry out 
the reorganisation efforts.81 These issues became even more prominent as a result of 
the Covid-19 pandemic, as a large number of companies are now fighting for 
survival.  
The next part focuses on LTAs. The purpose is to demonstrate if and to what extent 
the use of LTAs has proven consistent with the goal of creating a balanced, efficient, 
adaptable and flexible framework that promotes both corporate and business rescue 
(as well as liquidation of assets where rescue is not a viable option).  
 
 
77 Paragraphs 14-21, Schedule B1 IA 1986. 
78 English courts have consistently recognised the validity of clauses that prevent the application of 
insolvency statutory remedies. For instance, creditors can enter into “non-petition agreements” 
whereby they bind themselves not to trigger formal insolvency proceedings and thus rendering the 
debtor “bankruptcy remote”: Re Colt Telecom Plc (No 2) [2002] EWHC 2815 (Ch), [2003] BPIR 324; BNY 
Corporate Trustee Services v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL Plc [2013] UKSC 28, [2013] 1 WLR 1408. For a 
comprehensive analysis of the cases in which parties can contract out of English insolvency law: H 
Anderson, The Framework of Corporate Insolvency Law (OUP 2017) 270. Equally, English courts have 
held that there is nothing objectionable in a creditor using its bargaining strength to hold the office-
holder “to ransom”, as no person can be compelled to trade with another absent any statutory or 
contractual obligations: Leyland DAF ltd v Automotive Products plc [1993] B.C.C. 389 (CA), 398 (Dillon 
LJ). 
79 Section 14(3) CIG Act, which introduces section 233B to the Act. 
80 G McCormack, ‘Super-priority New Financing and Corporate Rescue’ (2007) JBL 701. 
81 For an outline, see Finch and Milman (n 41) 316. 
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III. Light Touch Administrations 
Restructuring administrations have been a feature of the English insolvency 
framework since the EA 2002. The idea of restructuring or “light touch” 
administration (‘LTA’) was recently reinstated in a briefing to the Government 
prepared by the Insolvency Lawyers Association (ILA).82 This idea originated as a 
mechanism to combine the principles of receiverships83 and the powers of the 
administrators.84  
Under English insolvency law, upon the appointment of an administrator, the 
directors remain in office, and have a duty to co-operate with the appointed IP.85 
However, in a traditional administration, the management is usually replaced by IPs 
upon the opening of the procedure. In addition, the administrator has the power to 
appoint and remove directors86 or to allow them to exercise specific powers.87 
While administration is widely seen as a management-displacing procedure, the law 
allows the administrators to leave management powers within the existing directors 
 
82 Insolvency Lawyer Association. ‘Changing the Narrative around Administration’ (London, 26 
March 2020) <http://www.citysolicitors.org.uk/storage/2020/03/UKP1-ChangingtheNarrative.pdf> 
accessed 1 July 2020. 
83 In an administrative receivership, company contracts usually continue to be enforceable, the 
company is not divested of its asserts and the directors remain in office: L Doyle, ‘The Residual Status 
of Directors in Receivership’ (1996) 17 Co. Law. 131. 
84 Paragraphs 59-68, Schedule B1 IA 1986. See also: van Zwieten (n 23) 533-538. 
85 Schedule 235 IA 1986 and paragraphs 47-48, Schedule B1 IA 1986. 
86 Denny v Yeldon [1995] 1 B.C.L.C. 560 (Ch, [564e]; Polly Peck International plc (in administration) v Henry 
[1998] 11 W.L.U.K. 510. 
87 Re Lehman Brothers Europe ltd (in administration) (No 9) and another [2017] EWHC 2031 (Ch), [2018] 
Bus. L.R. 439, where the court gave permission to the administrators to appoint a director and a 
shareholder to implement the distribution to the sole shareholder further to a reduction of capital as 
permitted by the CA 2006. This was consistent with the administrators’ duty to deal with the 
administration for the purpose for which it was sought, in the interests of creditors and expeditiously. 
In any case, directors retain the power to cause the company to challenge the validity of an out-of-
court appointment of administrators: Stephen, Petitioner [2011] CSOH 119, [2012] B.C.C. 537; Closegate 
Hotel Development (Durham ltd) v McLean [2013] EWHC 3237 (Ch), [2014] Bus. L.R. 405. 
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of the company.88 In LTAs, the management is, therefore, not replaced by the 
appointed administrator. 
In LTAs, the respective powers and duties of the administrators and directors are 
regulated by a ‘Consent Protocol’ prepared by the ILA and the City of London Law 
Society89 by Mark Phillips QC, William Willson and Stephen Robins of South Square. 
The management displacing aspect of administration arises out of a deeply rooted 
belief in English law that the party responsible for the company’s problems ought 
not to be left in control.90 However, the debtor’s crisis might be determined by 
external factors,91 such as the closure of a business due to Covid-19 emergency 
legislation and the ensuing downturn in the economy. In these circumstances, the 
argument that directors should be replaced because they are responsible for the 
company’s demise is less powerful. Hence, the need to explore solutions that retain 
the expertise of the existing management and workers, while providing respite from 
financial problems. 
This section carries out a doctrinal analysis of LTAs in order to determine to what 
extent the existing provisions in the insolvency law as interpreted by the courts and 




88 Paragraph 64, Schedule B1 IA 1986. There is a parallel with schedule 103 IA 1986, which provides 
that on the appointment of the liquidator, all of the directors’ powers cease. However, the liquidation 
committee or the creditors can sanction their continuance.  
89 Available here: < https://www.ilauk.com/docs/ILA.consent_.protocol_.17.April_.2020.V2_.pdf> 
accessed 1 July 2020. 
90 Finch and Milman (n 41) 301. 
91 Finch and Milman (n 41) 131-140. 
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III(a). Critical Assessment of LTAs  
LTAs seem to represent a valid mechanism to boost the efficiency, flexibility and 
adaptability of the system as they afford the company a breathing space in which the 
business can be stabilised and protected by individual actions from the creditors. 
In LTAs, the existing management team remains in place under the control and 
supervision of administrators and with the benefit of a stay from enforcement 
actions. This does not involve the delegation of powers from the administrator to the 
directors. Rather, the administrator simply consents to management retaining the 
powers which they already have so that they can get on with running the business. 
This DIP approach emulates what happens during U.S. Chapter 11 proceedings.92 
The idea behind the LTA is to protect the company in the period in which it cannot 
trade due to the lock-down measures or – more broadly – due to the consequences of 
the Covid-19 pandemic. Once these measures are lifted, the stores reopen and the 
economy ‘bounces back’, the staff who are on the furlough scheme will come back 
into the business and there will be extra money injected by the current owners and 
lenders.93 
In the past, LTAs were more frequently used in procedures involving real estate 
companies. In these proceedings, the properties are formally controlled by the 
administrators but managed by estate agents for a fee.94 This suggests that outside 
emergency times, LTAs are used by companies that are affected by unexpected 
downturns in the market and which may benefit from the expertise of the existing 
management in their sale or turnaround process.  
 
92 11 U.S. Code. 
93 Of course, not all stores will reopen, as in the case of Debenhams, which decided to liquidate its Irish 
chain: Z Wood, ‘Debenhams appoints administrators and liquidates Irish chain’ The Guardian 
(London, 9 April 2020) <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/apr/09/debenhams-appoints-
administrators-and-liquidates-irish-chain> accessed 1 July 2020. 
94 See, among others: Re Partnership of Isaacs (in administration) [2017] EWHC 2405 (Ch), [2018] B.C.C. 
551 (where, however, the court granted permission for the receivers to be re-appointed to enforce 
rights of sale because the administrator’s decision to remove the receivers was not reasonable on the 
basis of the circumstances of the case).  
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The time of writing (spring/summer 2020) is unique and exceptional. Many 
companies from different sectors of the economy are struggling for the forced 
closures imposed to slow the spread of the Covid-19 pandemic. These companies are 
certainly distressed due to lack or significant reduction in their revenues, but they 
may be viable in the long term. 
According to the Office of National Statistics,95 some sectors of the economy have 
been particularly badly affected by the Covid-19 pandemic. In the period 6-19 April 
2020, more than 1 out of 5 companies in the UK had temporarily closed or paused 
trading. This percentage, however, increased to 80.6 percent for companies operating 
in accommodation and food & services, and to 79.5 percent for companies operating 
in arts, entertainment and recreation. Unsurprisingly, where 23.4 percent of 
surveyed companies blamed a decrease in their turnover by 23.4 percent on a 
national basis, this percentage raised to 57 percent in the accommodation and food 
service sector, and to 50.9 percent in the arts, entertainment and recreation sector.  
Distressed yet viable companies from particularly badly affected sectors of the 
economy – such as those mentioned in the previous paragraph – can make a strong 
case for LTAs over traditional or pre-packaged administrations. This is because at 
the moment there is no market for these distressed companies and their assets, and 
there may be no need to liquidate otherwise profitable companies.  
The same conclusion may not be reached for companies operating in other sectors of 
the economy, where the restrictions imposed by the responses to the Covid-19 
pandemic have not significantly restricted trading opportunities. For instance, only 3 
percent of companies offering professional, scientific and technical services, and 4.5 
percent of firms operating in the IT sector were forced to close in the immediate 
 
95 J Gough, Business Impact of COVID-19 Survey (Office for National Statistics, 7 May 2020) 
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/economicoutputandproductivity/output/datasets/businessimpact
ofcovid19surveybics> accessed 19 June 2020. 
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aftermath of the Government-imposed lockdown.96 According to the most recent 
available data, in some sectors such as wholesale and retail trade, as well as 
transportation and storage, 17 and 10 percent of companies respectively reported an 
increase in their turnover compared with what is normally expected for the same 
time of the year.97 
If any of the companies operating in these sectors were to cease trading and enter 
into a formal insolvency procedure, it is argued that traditional remedies 
(liquidation and administration) may prove more effective than LTAs. This is 
because there is a market and demand for their assets and activities, with the result 
that their value had not been negatively affected. 
All these elements seem to suggest that LTAs represent a powerful tool to enhance 
the rescue options available to English companies in a balanced manner and in 
compliance with the established turnaround approaches under the law. However, is 
this really so? 
 
III(b). Recent Case Law on LTAs 
The recent case of Davey v Money98 decided in April 2018 has given administrators 
guidance on LTAs and on how they can minimise their risk of liability for breach of 
duty when selling company assets. This case is primarily about an alleged breach of 
duty of the administrators, as the applicant argued that they failed to exercise 
independent judgment and instead paid excessive regard to the interests and wishes 
of the charge holder who had appointed them. 
Snowden J gave three main guidelines in the instant case: 
 
96 Ibid. 
97 J Gough, Coronavirus and the economic impacts on the UK: 18 June 2020 (Office for National statistics, 
18 June 2020) 
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade/business/businessservices/bulletins/coronavirus
andtheeconomicimpactsontheuk/latest> accessed 19 June 2020. 
98 Davey v Money [2018] EWHC 766 (Ch), [2018] Bus. L.R. 1903. 
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1. Administrators have no obligation to consult on the shareholders and existing 
directors to decide the best course of action in insolvency; 
2. The persons who manage the company under the supervision of the 
administrator may be appointed or otherwise connected with the creditor 
who submitted the administration petition; 
3. There is no obligation to sell the debtor’s assets in a competitive tendering 
process. 
Unlike the case of Debenhams, in Davey the LTA was used to make a distribution to 
the secured creditor in accordance with paragraph 3(1)(c), Schedule B1 of the Act. At 
the same time, the court highlighted that “the more deferential standard of review of 
the decision of the administrator as to which objective to pursue does not also extend 
to the methods adopted by the administrator to pursue his chosen course”.99 This 
suggests that, at least in theory, LTAs are not the modern version of old 
administrative receiverships, where the receiver acts only in the interest of the 
appointor100 and is not adequately incentivised to maximise the return to all 
creditors.101 So far, therefore, the positive narrative surrounding LTAs seems to be 
confirmed. 
In giving the judgment, Snowden J correctly observed that administrators have 
discretion to decide the best course of actions in the procedure, including opting for 
a LTA. Snowden J also observed that there is no "fundamental" rule requiring the 
administrators in every case to go through a process of consultation with the 
directors and shareholders, on how to conduct the procedure and on its main 
 
99 Ibid [256]. 
100 Re B. Johnson & Co. (Builders) ltd [1955] Ch 634, 661-2; Gomba Holdings UK ltd and others v Homan and 
Bird [1986] 1 WLR 1301, 1304-5 (Hoffmann J); Downsview Nominees ltd v First City Corporation [1993] 
AC 295. At the same time, the Court of Appeal in Medforth v Blake ([1999] 3 All. E.R. 97) held that 
when administrative receivers manage a property, they need to do it with due diligence. 
101 DTI, Productivity and Enterprise: Insolvency – A Second Chance (Cm 5234, 2001), [2.2]-[2.3]. 
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purpose.102 Failure to consult with the shareholders does not lead to a claim for 
breach of duty.103 In the absence of any suggestion that administrators were acting 
improperly, it would be contrary to the nature and purpose of an administration if 
the court were to interfere in the detailed day to day management of the 
administration.104 
The decision in this case, however, may fail to properly put into practice the 
predicament that LTAs are not the modern version of old administrative 
receiverships.  
The case was brought by the sole shareholder of the debtor. The claimant 
complained that the administrator decided before being appointed that the purpose 
of the procedure was only to make a distribution to the secured creditor, without 
properly considering alternative outcomes. The claimant also alleged a breach of 
duty of the administrator because he left the day-to-day management of the property 
and its sale to an agent appointed by the secured creditor.  
Nevertheless, the court held that the chosen objective should be open to challenge 
only if it was made in “bad faith or was clearly perverse”.105 This should apply in the 
instant case, where the administrator agreed on the course of action and to cap his 
fees in the sum of £42,000 before being appointed.106  
In the author’s view, the applicant was right to argue that the appointors can tailor 
the selection of the purpose of the administration, depending on how much they are 
willing to pay the administrator. The court should have been open to adopt a more 
interventionist standard of review of an administrator's opinion in regards to the 
purpose of the procedure. It is not realistic to think that a professional would 
consider carrying out an extensive, complex insolvency procedure for the money 
 
102 Davey (n 98) [287]. 
103 Ibid [325]. 
104 Lehman (n 87). 
105 Ibid [255]. 
106 Davey (n 98) [263]. 
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negotiated to conduct a LTA designed to liquidate assets for the benefit of one 
creditor.  
According to the facts of the case, the IP was constrained in the exercise of his 
functions as administrator by his discussions or arrangements on fees with the 
secured creditor. It was not possible to renegotiate the fee arrangement should the 
administrator have chosen a different course of action during the procedure.  
A LTA commenced under these premises should be open to challenge from 
interested parties because there is a high risk of: (i) abuse of the procedure107 and 
collusion between the administrator and the appointor; and (ii) failing to properly 
assess the prospects for achieving the two primary purposes of administration, i.e. 
rescuing the company or its business. As a result, it is submitted that the guidance 
given by Snowden J in this case is open to criticism because it does not strike a 
proper balance between the interest of all the parties involved in the procedure. 
Furthermore, the court held that it is not necessary for the administrator to appoint 
property agents who are independent of the charge-holder.108 However, it is a well-
established principle of common law that officers of the court like administrators109 
should “maintain an even and impartial hand between all the individuals whose 
 
107 For a detailed analysis of the notion of “abuse of law” in the English tradition, see (among others): 
E Vaccari, ‘English Pre-packaged Corporate Rescue Procedures: Is There a Case for Propping Industry 
Self-regulation and Industry-led Measures such as the Pre-Pack Pool?’ (2020) 31(3) I.C.C.L.R. 170, 178-
185. For a case law perspectives, see (among others): Re Kayley Vending ltd [2009] EWHC 904 (Ch), 
[2009] B.C.C. 578 (arguing that in exercising its discretion in pre-pack cases, the court had to be alert 
to see that the procedure was not being abused to the disadvantage of creditors); Vedanta Resources Plc 
v Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20; [2019] 2 W.L.R. 1051 (arguing that to prove the existence of such abuse, is 
not sufficient to show that a statute has been misused or circumvented, but also that this improper 
use is the result of a collusive decision of the parties designed to subvert other statutory provisions); 
and Pendragon Plc v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2015] UKSC 37; [2015] 1 W.L.R. 2838 (arguing 
that aiming at a legitimate commercial purpose may not justify the use of a method designed to 
subvert the law). 
108 Davey (n 98) [341]: “The essential question in all cases will be whether the agents to be appointed 
are competent and able to discharge their fiduciary duties to the company”. 
109 Paragraph 5, Schedule B1 IA 1986, stating that “an administrator is an officer of the court (whether 
or not he is appointed by the court)”. 
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interests are involved”110 in the procedure. As a result, a creditor or member of a 
company in administration may apply to the court claiming that the administrator is 
acting, has acted or proposes to act so as unfairly to harm the interests of the 
applicant.111 
The actions of the administrator should rightly be assessed holistically.112 The courts 
would not challenge decisions only where they appear unbiased and the 
administrators were entitled to reach such decision on the basis of the material in 
front of them.113 Furthermore, it is an established common law principle114 that courts 
will not permit their officers to act in a way which, although lawful and in 
accordance with enforceable rights, does not accord with the standards which right-
thinking people or, as it may be put, society would think should govern the conduct 
of the court or its officers. Courts apply the standard on an objective basis115 and the 
principle is not limited to cases where the court officer was pursuing a course of 
conduct which the court thought was dishonest.116 
Referring the day-to-day management of the assets of a company to a non-
independent party, who has no duty or obligation towards the creditors as a whole 
is potentially a breach of the administrators’ duties. Snowden J argued that as the 
administrator is an agent but not a trustee of the company, the administrator is 
merely subject to the fiduciary duties to act in good faith, loyally and for proper 
 
110 Re Contract Corp (1872) 7 Ch App 207, 211. The judgment was issued with reference to the duties of 
liquidators in a winding-up procedure but it applies to all officers of the court. 
111 Paragraph 74, Schedule B1 IA 1986. 
112 Nimat Halal Food Ltd v Nimish Patel (in his capacity as administrator of Tariq Halal Meat (Ilford) Ltd) 
[2020] EWHC 734 (Ch), 2020 WL 01666535. 
113 Re St George’s Property Services (London) Ltd (in administration) [2010] EWHC 2538 (Ch), [2010] Bus. 
L.R. 1747. 
114 Re Condon (ex parte James) (1873-74) L.R. 9 Ch. App. 609; Ex parte Simmonds (1885) QBD 308, 312 per 
Lord Esher MR; Re Tyler [1907] 1 KB 865 per Vaughan Williams LJ at 869, Farwell LJ at 871 and 
Buckley LJ at 873. See also: Re Thellusson (ex parte Abdy) [1919] 2 K.B. 735 and Re Wigzell (ex parte Hart) 
[1921] 2 K.B. 835. This principle was recently reinstated and exhaustively analysed by the Court of 
Appeal in Lehman Brothers Australia ltd (in liquidation) v MacNamara [2020] EWCA Civ 321, [2020] 3 
W.L.U.K. 21, [35]-[69]. 
115 Lehman v MacNamara (n 114) [36]. 
116 Thellusson (n 114) 743. 
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purposes, as well as the non-fiduciary duty to exercise reasonable care.117 In other 
words, the fact that the person appointed to manage the company in administration 
had no duty towards the creditors is not a problem. As a result, this judgment may 
represent a significant, unwarranted departure from the principle that 
administrators (and their collaborators) should be, and be seen to be, independent 
and impartial in their management of the company and its property.118  
It is also to be noted that such light touch approach to the revision of administrators’ 
duties sits at odds with recent decisions from higher courts. For instance, in Lehman v 
MacNamara the Court of Appeal rejected the strict interpretation of the principle in ex 
parte James given at first instance (and basically later followed in Davey). Richard LJ, 
to whom Newey LJ and Patten LJ concurred, relied on relatively recent authorities119 
to hold that it was appropriate to depend on the substantive and objective concept of 
fairness to determine if an officer of the court acted in breach of his or her fiduciary 
duties.120 
At the same time, nothing in Davey suggests that the actions of the non-independent 
property agents resulted in an unfair advantage to someone or in “a tangible 
detriment to an individual creditor compared to another creditor or creditors”.121 In 
the absence of a loss or damage to one of the parties, the principle of ex parte James 
does not apply.122 Therefore, the case was correctly decided on this point but the 
 
117 Davey (n 98) [385]. 
118 Paragraph 3(2), Schedule B1 IA 1986. However, the alleged existence of a “close relationship” 
between the administrators and one of the major creditors interested in buying the debtor’s assets is 
not enough to suggest lack of independence and perception of bias if the applicants have no economic 
interest in the administration: Re SS Agri Power ltd [2017] EWHC 2431 (Ch), [2017] 9 W.L.U.K. 384. 
Courts also adopt a hard stance on tactical petitions: Re TPS Investments (UK) ltd (in administration) 
[2018] EWHC 360 (Ch), [2019] 1 B.C.L.C. 61, holding that: (i) an application to remove an 
administrator on the basis of a conflict of interest should never be made without careful consideration 
of the position; and (ii) precipitate and tactical applications (such as in the instant case) were to be 
deprecated. 
119 Re Lune Metal Products Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1720, [2007] 2 BCLC 746; Re Nortel GmbH (in 
administration) [2013] UKSC 52, [2014] AC 209 
120 Lehman v MacNamara (n 114) [68]. 
121 Re Sheridan Millenium Ltd [2013] NICh 13, [2013] 9 W.L.U.K. 347. 
122 Re TH Knitwear (Wholesale) Ltd [1988] Ch 275, 290. 
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rationale given by Snowden J (i.e. his guidelines in LTAs) may potentially unduly 
promote the use of these procedures against alternative rescue and liquidation 
options. 
Finally, the court held that administrators will not necessarily breach their duties by 
selling real property following a 'soft marketing' campaign where only particular 
specialised and complex potential purchasers are targeted and contacted.123  
This outcome is in line with established precedents. In Meem, the High Court held 
that company administrators had not unfairly harmed the interests of creditors by 
auctioning a claim against the debtor’s former directors, as the proposed auction 
would achieve a fixed price without delay for an asset whose value was difficult to 
assess.124 Neither in Meem nor in Davey there was evidence that the sale process 
resulted in an unfair harm of the creditors’ interests. Additionally, courts have 
consistently refused to challenge the decision of an administrator if he or she was 
unbiased and was entitled on the material before him or her to reach a relevant 
conclusion.125 
It follows that, according to the Davey’s guidelines: 
a) IPs have almost unfettered discretion to decide whether administration 
should take place as a pre-packaged, light touch or fully-fledged procedure; 
b) Courts exercise a light touch revision of the administrators’ decisions, even if 
there is evidence of extensive negotiations between appointor and 
administrator before the commencement of the procedure, the persons in 
control of the company during administration are not independent of the 
charge-holder and the assets are not sold in a competitive tendering process. 
 
 
123 Ibid [413]. 
124 Re Meem SL ltd (in administration) [2017] EWHC 2688 (Ch), [2018] Bus. L.R. 393.  
125 St George’s Property (n 113). 
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III(c). Concluding Remarks 
The analysis of these guidelines shows a pro-LTA attitude of the English commercial 
courts. If unchecked, this may favour the interests of some parties (mainly, the 
appointor and leading creditors) at the expense of other key, interested players. 
These guidelines also raise issues of transparency and fairness similar to those 
observed with reference to pre-packs before the Graham Review126 and the ensuing 
reforms.  
It is too early to determine if other courts will adopt a more interventionist approach 
than Davey to ensure that directors act in the interest of all creditors under the 
effective supervision of the administrator. Davey seems to suggest that courts are 
unwilling to exercise a close scrutiny on this matter. The authority of the judge who 
issued the judgment suggests that courts are unlikely to significantly depart from 
this approach absent any statutory or regulatory intervention.  
The next part of this paper extends the investigation to the new restructuring 
procedure recently introduced by the CIG Act. The purpose of this preliminary 
assessment is to determine if the new restructuring procedure enhances the 
efficiency, adaptability and flexibility of the system in a balanced manner, i.e. by not 
minimising or overlooking the issues of transparency and fairness evidenced in the 
practice of LTAs. 
 
 
126 T Graham, ‘Graham Review into Pre-pack Administration: Report to the Rt Hon Vince Cable MP’ 
The Insolvency Service (London, 16 June 2014) paragraph 5.3 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/graham-review-into-pre-pack-administration> 
accessed 1 July 2020. 
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IV. The New Restructuring Plan127 
The restructuring plan was first proposed in a consultation in 2016. 128 The 2016 
consultation was followed by another consultation in 2018129 triggered by several 
high-profile cases, such as BHS Ltd and Carillion Plc. The 2016 consultation was the 
UK response on the European debate on preventive restructuring measures, which 
led to the directive no. 2019/1023 on preventive restructuring frameworks.130 The 
Government published a joint response to these consultations on 26 August 2018.131 
The new restructuring plan was finally introduced by schedule 9 of the CIG Act, 
which inserted Part 26A to the Companies Act 2006 (‘CA 2006’). 
The procedure of the new restructuring plan is largely based on the schemes of 
arrangement,132  in order to build on their flexible nature as well as to rely on their 
extensive jurisprudence. Not surprisingly, the short legislative provisions on plans 
are located immediately after those on schemes in the CA 2006 instead of the 
Insolvency Act 1986. 
 
127 A preliminary analysis of this procedure appeared here: E Vaccari, ‘The New Corporate Insolvency 
and Governance Act 2020 – An Extraordinary Act for Extraordinary Times? A Quick Look at the Act’s 
Long-Term Statutory Reforms’ (Essex Law Research, 1 July 2020) 
<https://essexlawresearch.blog/2020/07/01/the-new-corporate-insolvency-and-governance-act-2020-
an-extraordinary-act-for-extraordinary-times-a-quick-look-at-the-acts-long-term-statutory-reforms/> 
accessed 8 July 2020. 
128 The Insolvency Service, A Review of the Corporate Insolvency Framework. A Consultation on Options for 
Reform (May 2016) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/5
25523/A_Review_of_the_Corporate_Insolvency_Framework.pdf > accessed 1 July 2020. The 
consultation closed on 6 July 2016 and the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy 
(‘BEIS’) published a summary of responses on 28 September 2016: The Insolvency Service, Summary of 
Responses: A Review of the Corporate Insolvency Framework (September 2016) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/Government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
578524/Summary_of_responses_26-10-16_Redacted.pdf> accessed 1 July 2020. 
129 BEIS, Insolvency and Corporate Governance (n 80). 
130 Directive (EU) 2019/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on 
preventive restructuring framework [2019] OJ L 172/18. 
131 BEIS, Insolvency and Corporate Governance. Government Response (n 10). 
132 Part 26 CA 2006. 
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The procedure commences with a petition from the company (or its administrator or 
liquidator), a creditor or a member.133 In practice, the company and its directors need 
to support the arrangement for the court to allow the petition and convene the 
creditors’ meeting. The court will grant leave to convene if it is satisfied that the 
composition of classes is fair and reasonable and that the company has encountered 
or is likely to encounter financial difficulties that are affecting or will affect its ability 
to carry on business as a going concern.134.  
Only creditors and members who have a “genuine economic interest” in the 
company should be allowed to vote on the plan.135 The CIG Act does not provide a 
definition of “genuine economic interest”. Nevertheless, parties are understood to 
have such interest if they are likely to receive a distribution of assets or money as a 
result of the arrangement or the relevant alternative. 
The creditors and members are then required to vote in different classes on the plan 
prepared by the company and on the basis of the statements made available before 
the meeting.136 At least 75 per cent in value of each relevant class of creditors must 
vote in favour of the restructuring plan for it to proceed to sanction.137 However, 
courts can also sanction such plan if one or more of the impaired classes vote against 
the plan.138 
Similar to LTAs and schemes of arrangement, this new restructuring plan emulates 
U.S. Chapter 11 proceedings139 despite notable differences. For instance, super-
priority security is not available to facilitate DIP financing while this mechanism is 
accessible under U.S. bankruptcy law. 
 
133 Section 901C(2) CA 2006. 
134 Section 901A(2) CA 2006. 
135 Section 901C(4) CA 2006.  
136 Section 901D CA 2006. 
137 Section 901F(1) CA 2006. 
138 Section 901G CA 2006. 
139 11 U.S. Code. 
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The new restructuring plan combines the benefit of other, existing English rescue 
procedures. It represents a DIP procedure (such as a CVA) with an automatic stay on 
individual actions against the debtor (such as in administration).140 This new 
restructuring plan is binding on all the creditors if their class votes in favour of the 
plan (such as in schemes of arrangement).141 Unlike schemes, as mentioned above, it 
also includes a cross-class cram-down mechanism.142  
“Cross-class cram down” is a prominent feature of the US Chapter 11 process. 
Usually, a restructuring plan can only be approved if the required majority of 
creditors vote in favour of it. If creditors are divided in classes, all classes need to 
reach the required majority but dissenting creditors within that class are out-voted by 
the other creditors within the same class. If cross-class cram down is allowed, 
dissenting classes of creditors can be out-voted provided that the other classes vote in 
favour of the restructuring plan.  
The addition of a cram-down mechanism across classes is particularly notable. It 
means that the debtor could force both out-of-the-money and in-the-money classes 
of creditors to accept a plan, an option which is not currently available neither in 
CVAs nor in schemes of arrangement. The cram-down mechanism is subject to the 
court being satisfied that the plan is fair and equitable, and that the dissenting 
creditors would be no worse off than in the relevant alternative.143 The plan, 
however, needs to have received the assent of at least one class of creditors who 
would obtain a payment, or have a genuine economic interest in the company, in the 
event of the relevant alternative. This relevant alternative is whatever the court 
considers would be most likely to occur in relation to the company if the 
 
140 An automatic stay is also granted to small companies undertaking a CVA: see section 1A IA 1986, 
introduced by the Insolvency Act 2000. However, the CVA stay lasts either until a company meeting 
takes place and the creditors decide whether to approve the proposal or for up to 28 days (subject to 
extension for up to 2 months).  
141 Section 901F(5) CA 2006. 
142 Section 901G CA 2006. 
143 Section 901G(3) CA 2006. 
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compromise or arrangement were not sanctioned under section 901F CA 2006.144 This 
usually means the insolvency counter-factual, i.e. a pre-packaged administration 
procedure.  
 
IV(a). Critical Analysis of the New Restructuring Plans 
These measures seem to go in the direction of promoting the rescue of the company 
over its business or the liquidation of its assets. This procedure is designed to be 
triggered by a petition from the debtors (although creditors and office holders also 
have the right to submit such petition). It is a debtor-led rescue procedure which 
allows the proposing party to put forward a plan and to implement it against 
dissenting (classes of) creditors. It is foreseeable that debtors would favour the 
implementation of rescue plans, where the renegotiation of existing financial 
obligations and the restructuring of the business do not lead to wiping out the 
existing shareholders and management. Unlike independently appointed 
administrators, debtors have strong incentives to explore rescue of the company 
over alternative solutions.   
Other elements promote company rescue over alternative goals. First, the plan 
requires the approval of either 75 percent by value of voting creditors across each 
class, or 75 percent by value of voting creditors in one class, provided that dissenting 
classes are paid in full before a junior class is paid out, and that the plan is in their 
best interests. It is salient to note that two requirements applicable to schemes and 
CVAs have not been replicated, with reference to the new restructuring plan, thus 
making it easier to achieve the requisite majority. These are the requirements that 
more than half in value of unconnected creditors and that the majority in number 
vote in favour of the plan. 
 
144 Section 901G(4) CA 2006. 
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Second, the court involvement is limited to two hearings. In the first one, the courts 
are asked to convene the meeting and examine the proposed class composition. In 
the second hearing, the courts sanction the vote and approve the plan if the statutory 
conditions for approval are met and if it is just and equitable to do so. The out-of-
court nature of the procedure facilitates negotiations between the parties. 
Additionally, if courts show willingness to streamline the procedure for the first 
hearing, the new restructuring plan can become extremely appealing to micro, small 
and medium enterprises. This would address one of the drawbacks of the schemes, 
which are currently used primarily by large corporations restructuring financial 
debt.  
Third, the restructuring plan is available to all companies that are encountering, or 
are likely to encounter, financial difficulties that are affecting, or will or may affect, 
their ability to carry on business as a going concern.145 There is, therefore, no need for 
the debtor to be insolvent and the plan is virtually a blank canvas.146 Debtors are, 
therefore, encouraged to make use of this instrument as early as possible to wipe out 
existing liabilities while retaining control of their companies. 
Finally, the House of Lords’ removal of the protections initially included for 
creditors with aircraft-related interests means that that they can be compromised by 
a scheme or restructuring plan. This is welcome news for the distressed airline 
industry, which can now make use of those processes. 
It is apparent that the restructuring plan reinvigorates the country’s rescue culture 
by changing and expanding the corporate restructuring toolkit. Together with the 
new standalone automatic stay, this instrument promotes one goal (company rescue) 
over alternative outcomes (business rescue and liquidation of assets). It provides key 
stakeholders (debtors) with the power to prioritise their interests (e.g. continue 
 
145 Section 901A(2) CA 2006. 
146 Section 901A(4) CA 2006. 
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trading and retain control of the company) over competing ones (e.g. maximisation 
of returns to creditors).147  
There are, however, some aspects that may prevent the use of these mechanisms as 
company rescue procedures. For instance, with reference to the new restructuring 
plan, valuation plays a key role as it is the element which determines if impaired 
classes can be “crammed-down”. However, as evidenced elsewhere,148 valuation is 
an extremely controversial process. The new restructuring plan builds on the 
existing case law for scheme on valuations. Unfortunately, valuation is not salient in 
schemes, as the court’s focus in these procedures is on ensuring that parties behave 
in good faith. As a result, English courts have generally accepted valuations based 
on the debtor’s current market value as opposed to the more complex approach 
followed by U.S. Bankruptcy Courts that require valuations to be based on the post-
reorganisation value determined on the basis of discounted cash-flow methods.149 
There is also the risk of reverse cram-down, or “cram-up”. This is when the 
restructuring plan is used in a strategic manner by junior classes of creditors and/or 
the company’s members to “impose” a plan on dissenting senior creditors. Courts 
could in theory discourage this practice by not sanctioning plans that are not “just 
and equitable”. However, English courts have proven reluctant to interfere with 
business judgments.150 Additionally, the absence of any absolute priority rule – 
 
147 Even if creditors who have a claim not subject to a moratorium holiday, such as loan agreements, 
have to be paid in full during the standalone moratorium. As a result, their interests are unlikely to be 
affected. 
148 E Vaccari, 'Broken Companies or Broken System? Charting the English Insolvency Valuation 
Framework in Search for Fairness' (2020) 35(4) JIBLR 135; E Vaccari, ‘Promoting Fairness in English 
Insolvency Valuation Cases' (2020) 29(2) Int. Insolv. Rev. 1. 
149 Vaccari, ‘Charting the Framework’ (n 137). 
150 See, for instance, Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co ltd [1925] Ch 407, where the court held that 
directors need to manifest no more skill than someone as competent or inexperienced as they were. 
Additionally, directors were not bound to give continuous attention to the affairs of their companies. 
More recent cases have adopted a more stringent approach towards errant directors: Norman v 
Theodore Goddard [1991] 7 WLUK 121; Re D’Jan of London ltd [1993] B.C.C. 646; Jackson v Casey [2019] 
EWHC 1657 (Ch), [2019] 6 WLUK 651. 
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which was nevertheless touted when the reforms were first announced in August 
2018 – may further promote a liberal judicial approach in the sanctioning hearing. 
 
IV(b). Concluding Remarks 
The concern that the new restructuring plan is too similar to existing provisions and 
practices is, to a large extent, unfounded. The restructuring plans boost the remedies 
available to debtors to rescue their company and their business.  
However, the risks associated with the implementation and judicial supervision of 
the new restructuring plans may mean that little progress is achieved in the areas of 
transparency and fairness. 
 
V. Conclusion 
The Explanatory Notes to the EA 2002 outline different scenarios of companies 
facing financial difficulties. Where the company is facing temporary financial 
difficulties that require a composition of its debt or an arrangement with its 
creditors, the Notes suggest that the best approach is to rescue the company.151 
Conversely, where part of the business model is unprofitable and no support is 
forthcoming from the lenders, the same Notes suggest that a preferable approach is 
to rescue the business.152  
The Notes and the analysis carried out in part II of this paper suggest the need for a 
balanced range of options to deal with companies in distress. These shall be rescuing 
the company or its business, or liquidating its assets when rescue is not reasonably 
practicable and this would lead to a higher return to creditors.  
 
151 Explanatory Notes to the EA 2002, [647]. 
152 Ibid [650]. 
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The argument underpinning this paper is that the English corporate insolvency 
framework should preserve and promote the use of a balanced range of liquidation, 
business-rescue and company-rescue options in order to be efficient, flexible and 
adaptable. 
Saint Paul in the Romans did suggest that we should not let any debt remain 
outstanding.153 However, this paper shows that some of the recent regulatory 
reforms and the judicial interpretation of existing provisions are mis-focused, as they 
promote efficiency, adaptability and flexibility at the expense of fairness, 
transparency and accountability. This gives unfettered power to key players (mainly, 
directors, administrators and charge-holders) and increases the chances of abusive or 
at least strategic use of insolvency procedures.  
 
153 The Apostle also suggested that paying our debt to love others fulfil the law, but this is beyond the 
scope of this paper.  
